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THE SHORTCOMINGS OF NEW YORK'S
LONG-ARM STATUTE: DEFAMATION IN
THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY
ROBERT D. NUSSBAUMt
"He who steals my purse, steals trash; but, he who steals my
reputation steals my life."1
INTRODUCTION
"I have no doubt in my mind that I saw the coach guzzling
beer at the party."2 That is what Patricia MacLaren, a California
resident, said about Leon Talbot, the head coach of the men's
basketball team at St. Lawrence University in upstate New
York. The accusation was printed in a New York newspaper4
and had the potential to destroy Talbot's reputation and ruin his
career. However, when Talbot sued MacLaren for defamation in
New York, the case was dismissed as a matter of law.5 The New
York Court of Appeals held that the court lacked personal
jurisdiction pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
("CPLR") section 302-New York's long-arm jurisdiction statute.
t Notes and Comments Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., 2014, St. John's
University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Binghamton University. Special thanks to Vice
Dean Emeritus Andrew J. Simons, not only for his guidance in helping me write this
Note, but also for being an invaluable mentor, both in law school and in the years to
come. I would also like to thank my parents, Sheila and Alan Nussbaum, for their
everlasting love and support-without whom this would not be possible.
' Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and
the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 712 (1986) (citing Laniecki v. Polish Army
Veterans Ass'n, 480 A.2d 1101, 1105 (1984)).
2 Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 522 N.E.2d 1027,
1028, 527 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (1988).
Id. at 828-29, 522 N.E.2d at 1028, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
4 See id.
Id. at 829, 522 N.E.2d at 1028, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
6 Id.
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Long-arm jurisdiction statutes have existed for more than
half a century,7 and dictate when a state may exercise
jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries-individuals who are not
permanent residents of the state.9 Section 302 of the New York
CPLR10 specifically enumerates the situations in which a New
York court may exercise jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries. 11 For
example, jurisdiction may be exercised over a non-domiciliary
who "commits a tortious act within the state," 2 or who "commits
a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state." 3 However, there is an exception to
these rules: If the tort committed is defamation, jurisdiction
shall not be exercised. 4
The decision to exclude acts of defamation from the confines
of CPLR section 302 was a policy decision of the New York
legislature when the law was first enacted in 1962.11 Primarily,
the legislature was concerned with the potential infringement of
First Amendment protections and did not want to inhibit free
speech by making individuals defend themselves in states "where
7 See Richard A. Barsotti, Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Individuals: A
Long-Arm Statute Proposed for California, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 313, 318 (1969)
(noting that Illinois adopted "the prototype for modem long-arm provisions" in
1957).
8 See David C. Tunick, Up Close and Personal: A Close-Up Look at Personal
Jurisdiction, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 1158-59 (1996) (noting that to be able to
assert jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary, "a state court must satisfy federal due
process and the state's personal jurisdiction statute, known as the long-arm
statute").
9 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 559 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a domiciliary as "[a]
person who resides in a particular place with the intention of making it a principal
place of abode").
10 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 2008).
11 Id.
12 Id. § 302(a)(2).
13 Id. § 302(a)(3).
14 See id. § 302(a)(2)-(3). ("As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-
domiciliary ... who ... commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause
of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or commits a tortious act
without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a
cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act." (emphasis added)).
'" See Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, at
C302:10 (McKinney 2008) ("The exclusion is based on a policy decision that
recognizes the ease with which a written or oral utterance may occur in New York,
thereby subjecting numerous individuals and media organizations to suit in New
York despite their potentially remote connection to the state.").
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they had no substantial interests."16  This means that
domiciliaries like Talbot, who have been defamed by non-
domiciliaries, cannot obtain redress in New York, despite the fact
that New York is where they have been defamed. 17 Meanwhile, if
a non-domiciliary commits any other tort in New York, or
commits any other tort causing injury to a New York citizen,
jurisdiction would be proper and the non-domiciliary can be held
liable in a New York court of law. 8
Given the technological age that we live in, the statute is
woefully out of date. 9 With such widespread access to the
Internet and the growing popularity of social media, individuals
can defame New York citizens from outside of the state with just
a few quick keystrokes.2 ° Consequently, the effects of defamation
are that much more detrimental, given the ease with which so
many people have access to defamatory statements.2'
Additionally, the statute does not seem to be fair on its face or to
serve justice. Why should a New York court have jurisdiction
over a non-domiciliary who batters someone in the state,
intentionally inflicts emotional distress upon someone in the
state, or who sends a defective product into the state that causes
injury to an individual or property within the state, but not have
jurisdiction over the non-domiciliary who defames someone in the
state? This seems to go against the whole purpose of having a
long-arm statute-to be able to exert jurisdiction over those who
inflict harm within the state's borders. 22
16 See ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 15-8 (4th ed. 2012) (noting that the statute was "intended 'to avoid
unnecessary inhibitions on freedom of speech or the press' ") (citing 2 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 302.15 (2d ed. 2004)).
17 See C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)-(3); see also Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 71
N.Y.2d 827, 829, 522 N.E.2d 1027, 1028, 527 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (1988) (holding that
"CPLR 302(a)(1)... does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
MacLarens," who are residents of California).
'8 C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)-(2).
19 See Stephen W. Bosky, Note, Defamation in the Internet Age: Missouri's
Jurisdictional Fight Begins with Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 587,
587 (2012) (noting how the increase in technology has allowed easy communication
across state lines, creating new issues for jurisdiction).
20 See id. ("[Wlorldwide communication is available to anyone with a computer
and an Internet connection.").
21 See id. at 587-88 (noting how "the impact of Internet activity is felt in the
real world" and how "[t]he Internet has created a global village where information
can travel quickly around the world").
22 See Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, at
C302:10 ("The modern rationale of CPLR 302(a)(2) is based on the fairness of
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This Note suggests that the New York legislature amend
New York's long-arm statute so that it no longer excludes the tort
of defamation as a basis for long-arm jurisdiction. Part I
provides a brief background and history of jurisdiction and long-
arm statutes in general. It also focuses on New York's statute
more specifically. Part II focuses on the arguments for excluding
acts of defamation from long-arm jurisdiction and compares New
York's statute to those of other states. Finally, Part III examines
the different policy reasons for changing the statute and argues
that such a change will not offend Due Process or First
Amendment protections of free speech.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF LONG-ARM STATUTES
A. Jurisdiction and Long-Arm Statutes
Before a court may act to resolve a case, the court must first
possess jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute and
over the individuals involved. Jurisdiction "denotes the court's
power to award a judgment which imposes personal liability
upon the defendant."24 In Pennoyer v. Neff,25 the Supreme Court
first established that states automatically possess jurisdiction
over individuals and property residing within that state. Thus,
before long-arm jurisdiction statutes, states primarily exercised
jurisdiction over those who resided within their borders.27
However, the rise of interstate commerce and travel called for an
expansion of jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court recognized in
International Shoe Company v. Washington.2"
subjecting a non[-]domiciliary to jurisdiction whenever her in-state tortious conduct
is the cause of local harm.").
23 HERBERT PETERFREUND & JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, NEW YORK PRACTICE:
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS 211 (4th ed. 1978).
24 Id. at 213.
25 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
26 See id. at 723-24.
27 See id. at 722 (noting that prior to long-arm statutes there were "two well-
established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent
State[:] over persons and property").
28 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945).
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International Shoe established the "minimum contacts"
standard,29 which dictates that a court may exercise jurisdiction
when an out-of-state defendant has certain minimum contacts
with the forum state3°-the state in which the suit is filed.31 The
reasoning behind this standard is that certain minimum contacts
with the forum state show that the defendant availed itself of the
benefits of that state and therefore it should be reasonably
foreseeable that the defendant could be haled into court there.2
Therefore, under this test, haling an out-of-state defendant into
court "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' 33  Thus, International Shoe laid the
foundation for states to enact their own long-arm statutes, giving
states the ability to exercise jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries
without offending Due Process. 4
Since the landmark decision of International Shoe, most
states have adopted their own long-arm statutes, dictating the
specific conditions under which a particular state may exercise
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary.35 These long-arm statutes
generally fall under one of two categories. 6 The first category
consists of statutes that allow for jurisdiction to the full extent
permitted by Due Process under the Constitution. 7 In other
words, jurisdiction would be permitted over a non-domiciliary so
long as it did not offend the Constitution or the "minimum
contacts" standard 38 established by International Shoe. The
second category consists of statutes that enumerate certain
conditions that must be satisfied in order for jurisdiction to be
" See id. at 316 ("[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
30 Id. at 316.
31 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009).
32 Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
33 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463).
34 Id. ("[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it.").
35 See VEDDER, PRICE, KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZ, P.C., LONG-ARM STATUTES: A
FIFTY-STATE SURVEY i (2003), available at http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/
08-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf.
36 See Tunick, supra note 8, at 1159.
37 Id.
38 Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
exercised. 9 Under these types of statutes, personal jurisdiction
may not be exercised unless one of the specific requirements is
met, even though Due Process may otherwise be satisfied.40
B. New York's Long-Arm Statute
New York's long-arm statute falls into the second category,
as it highlights a number of specific situations under which a
New York court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-
domiciliary.41  Section 302 of the CPLR lays out these
requirements.42 It states that a New York court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who: (1) transacts
business within the state; (2) commits a tortious act within the
state; (3) commits a tortious act outside of the state causing
injury to an individual or property within the state; or (4) owns
or uses any real property within the state.43 However, there is
one key exception to the two provisions concerning tortious acts.44
A New York court shall not have jurisdiction over a non-
domiciliary if the tortious act committed is defamation.45 Section
302(a)(2) specifically states that a New York court "may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary" who "commits a
tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act. '46  Similarly,
section 302(a)(3) states that a New York court "may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary" who "commits a
tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act."47 Therefore, if a
non-domiciliary defames a New York citizen, while either in the
state or outside of the state, a New York court will not be able to
exercise jurisdiction solely on that ground.48
39 Tunick, supra note 8, at 1159.
40 Id.
41 See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 2008).
42 Id.
43 Id. § 302(a).
44 Id. § 302(a)(2)-(3).
45 Id.
' Id. § 302(a)(2).
41 Id. § 302(a)(3).
48 Id. § 302(a)(2)-(3).
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C. What Is Defamation?
Defamation involves the expression of a false statement to
another, which causes injury to the reputation of the individual
about whom the false statement was made49  More generally,
defamatory statements have been viewed as a means to expose
an individual "to public contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace,
or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking
persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in
society."5°  Defamation includes both slander, an oral
misstatement of fact, and libel, a written or published
misstatement of fact.51 In New York, in order to be successful in
a defamation suit, a plaintiff must bring suit within one year of
the defamatory remarks52 and must prove six elements beyond a
preponderance of the evidence. 3
First, there must be a defamatory statement of fact. 4 The
statement cannot be one of opinion. 5 Second, the statement
must regard the plaintiff.56 Third, the defendant must publish or
speak the misstatement of fact to a third party.57 Fourth, the
statement must be false." If the statement is found to be true,
no matter how horrible, the plaintiff will no longer have a cause
of action for defamation.59 Fifth, there must be some degree of
fault on the part of the defendant.0  In other words, the
defendant must have known that the statement was false or
must have acted negligently or recklessly in making the
statement.61 Finally, and most importantly, the plaintiff must
49 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009) (defining defamation as "[tihe
act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to a third
person").
10 Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 379, 366 N.E.2d
1299, 1305, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 949 (1977) (quoting Sydney v. Macfadden Newspaper
Pub. Corp., 242 N.Y. 208, 211-12, 151 N.E. 209, 210 (1926)).
51 2 NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 3:23, at 220-21 (2d ed.
2013).
52 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3) (McKinney 2006).




5 Id. at 220, 222.
s Id. at 222.
5' See id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 234.
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prove an injury as a result of the defamatory remark.62 In
addition, if the plaintiff is a public official, someone who has
responsibilities relating to governmental affairs, or a public
figure in general, there is a slightly higher burden of proof and
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant made the defamatory
statement out of actual malice.6
In defamation suits, injury to the plaintiff consists of damage
to reputation.64 This is often a difficult element to prove, given
the intangible nature of an individual's reputation, and the
difficulty with assessing the damage done to it. 65  Sometimes,
monetary damages may be easily ascertained if the defamed
individual is unable to work or loses a job as a result of the
defamation, thereby resulting in lost earnings.66 Similarly, the
plaintiff may become so emotionally distraught so as to require
medical treatment, resulting in medical expenses for which the
plaintiff may be compensated. Other times, injury to reputation
may be solely emotional and it may be highly difficult to assess a
monetary value for such injury.68 Regardless, the Supreme Court
has recognized that there is a "strong and legitimate state
interest in compensating.., individuals for injury to
reputation."69 This is because reputation ultimately affects the
way in which individuals choose to interact with each other, and
62 See id. at 222 ("[The law does not assume an injury to reputation, but insists
on some confirmation of such injury.").
63 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) ("The
constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."); see also id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring) ("The requirement that malice be
proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss
public affairs.").
64 NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 51, at 221-22.




66 See id.; Thomas Phillip Germeroth, Note, Trapped in the Zone: Emotional
Distress Claims Under the Federal Employers Liability Act After Gottshall v.
Consolidated Rail Corporation, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 203, 217 (1996) ("[T]he
intangible nature of emotional distress and the inherent difficulties in validating
and quantifying the injury have made courts reluctant to compensate plaintiffs for
emotional injuries alone.").
69 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
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the damage done to an individual's reputation can result in a
"loss of self and separation from the basic norms that govern
human life."70
Because defamation is comprised of speech, defamation law
has constantly clashed with First Amendment jurisprudence.
Since 1964 and the Supreme Court decision in New York Times
Company v. Sullivan,7 the Supreme Court has significantly
changed the common law notions of defamation by holding that
the First Amendment limits the state's ability to impose liability
for defamation under certain circumstances. Specifically, the
Court held that when the plaintiff is a public official, the plaintiff
must also prove that the defamatory statements were made with
actual malice.72 The Court has since struggled to balance First
Amendment protections against the interests of individuals who
have been defamed. 3  Nevertheless, while one of the central
purposes of the First Amendment is to protect an individual's
right to free speech," the amendment is not unlimited and it is
well-established doctrine that the First Amendment does not
grant individuals the freedom to make defamatory remarks
against others. 5
However, under the confines of New York's long-arm statute,
if a non-domiciliary defames a New York citizen, a New York
court will not have jurisdiction solely on that ground due to the
exceptions found in both CPLR section 302(a)(2) and section
302(a)(3).7 6 Therefore, in order for a New York court to be able to
exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who has engaged in
defamatory remarks, it must also be established that the
defendant either transacts business within New York or owns,
uses, or possesses any real property within New York.77 Often,
,0 Post, supra note 1, at 701.
71 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
72 NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 51, at 223-24.
73 See id. at 224-26.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15 NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, supra note 51, at 224-25;
Post, supra note 1, at 691.
76 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)-(3) (McKinney 2008).
7 Id. § 302(a)(1), (a)(4); see also SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v. Am. Working
Collie Ass'n, 18 N.Y.3d 400, 403, 963 N.E.2d 1226, 1228, 940 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527
(2012) ("[Dlefamation claims ... cannot form the basis for 'tortious act' jurisdiction,
[but] such claims may proceed against non-domiciliaries who transact business
within the state.").
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this is an impossible obstacle to overcome, as was recently the
case in SPCA of Upstate New York, Inc. v. American Working
Collie Association.8
In SPCA, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals ("SPCA"), a New York corporation, sued the American
Working Collie Association ("AWCA"), an Ohio corporation, in a
New York state court for defamatory remarks made by the
AWCA against the SPCA on the AWCA's website.79 After visiting
the SPCA, Jean Levitt, the President of the AWCA, wrote on her
organization's website that many of the dogs at the SPCA "were
held in a crowded, cluttered storage room," 0 that one of the dogs
had "urine-soaked paws,"8 ' and that the dogs at the SPCA "have
been denied rehabilitation, foster or adoptive homes, and the
dignity every living creature deserves." 2  The New York
Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was proper and refused to
dismiss the suit. 3 However, the Appellate Division reversed,
refusing to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR section 302
because it could not also be established that the AWCA
transacted business within New York.84 The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that defamation alone cannot be the
basis for jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary, given the statutory
exception found in CPLR section 302.5 Meanwhile, had the
defendant committed any other tort causing injury to the New
York plaintiff-trespass, misappropriation of a trade secret,
invasion of privacy, nuisance, etc.-that would have been
sufficient for a New York court to have exercised jurisdiction.88
78 18 N.Y.3d 400, 963 N.E.2d 1226, 940 N.Y.S.2d 525.
71 Id. at 402, 963 N.E.2d at 1227, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
80 Brief of Appellants at *14, SPCA of Upstate N.Y, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 400, 963
N.E.2d 1226, 940 N.Y.S.2d 525 (No. 2012-0006), 2011 WL 7561721.
81 Id.
82 Id.
' Don Lehman, Court Tosses SPCA Defamation Lawsuit, POSTSTAR.COM (June
4, 2010, 4:10 PM), http://poststar.com/news/local/article_6c0092f4-7015-lldf-83b3-
001cc4c03286.html.
84 SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v. Am. Working Collie Ass'n, 74 A.D.3d 1464,
1466-67, 903 N.Y.S.2d 562, 564-65 (3d Dep't 2010), affd, 18 N.Y.3d 400, 963 N.E.2d
1226, 940 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2012).
8 SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc., 18 N.Y.3d at 403, 963 N.E.2d at 1228, 940
N.Y.S.2d at 527.
88 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)-(3) (McKinney 2008).
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II. WHY EXCLUDE DEFAMATION?
Historically, several policy arguments have been made in
support of excluding defamation actions from the reach of New
York's long-arm jurisdiction statute. These arguments primarily
deal with the First Amendment, as the New York legislature did
not want to inhibit the free speech that it saw the First
Amendment to protect by allowing the exercise of jurisdiction
over non-domiciliaries in defamation actions." The legislature
was particularly influenced by several libel actions that were
brought in the early sixties by southern states against northern
newspapers.8 8 One such case was The New York Times Company
v. Sullivan,9 where The New York Times, a New York
corporation, was forced to defend itself in a libel action all the
way in Alabama.9 ° In light of such cases, the New York
legislature did not wish "to force newspapers published in other
states to defend themselves in states where they had no
substantial interests."91  Thus, the statute as codified was
intended "to avoid unnecessary inhibitions on freedom of speech
or the press."92
In drafting New York's long-arm statute, the legislature was
also influenced by the guarantee of free speech provided in
Article I, Section 8 of the New York State Constitution, which
was first adopted in the early nineteenth century. As the New
York Court of Appeals stated in Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski,
"This State... has long provided a hospitable climate for the free
exchange of ideas. 94 This idea was adopted by New York long
before the Supreme Court decided to apply the First Amendment
to the states, recognizing "the sensitive role of gathering and
87 See SACK, supra note 16, at 15-7-15-9 (noting how the drafters' decision to
exclude defamation as a basis for long-arm jurisdiction was "consistent with New
York's general statutory policy seeking to avoid jurisdictional overreaching when
First Amendment considerations are implicated").
88 Id. at 15-7.
"9 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
90 Id. at 256.
9' See SACK, supra note 16, at 15-7-15-8.
92 See id. at 15-8.
93 See Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 249, 567 N.E.2d 1270,
1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 913 (1991) ("[Tlhe free speech guarantee of the New York
State Constitution, begin[s] with the ringing declaration that '[elvery citizen may
freely speak, write and publish ... sentiments on all subjects.'" (citing N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 8)).
94 Id.
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disseminating news of public events."95 Therefore, there is a long
history in New York of "safeguarding the free press against
undue interference."96 The New York Court of Appeals has also
recognized that the "'protection afforded by the guarantees of
free press and speech in the New York Constitution is often
broader than the minimum required by' the Federal
Constitution."97 Consequently, the New York legislature did not
wish to offend the state's long recognized tradition of support for
free speech when it enacted New York's long-arm statute in 1962.
Aside from the written word, the ease with which a
slanderous statement can leave one's mouth has also been noted
as reason for excluding acts of defamation from New York's long-
arm statute.98  Consequently, the legislature felt that a non-
domiciliary's mere oral utterance should not automatically
subject that individual to New York jurisdiction, particularly
when the individual's other connections to the state are so far
removed. 99 With these policy arguments in mind, the drafters of
the statute hoped "that other states would reciprocate by
enacting statutes, or amending existing statutes, to respect the
First Amendment freedoms" that they so desperately wished to
protect. 100
Subliminally, the New York legislature may have intended
to protect New York organizations specifically. By enacting a
statute that made an exclusive exemption for defamation, the
New York legislature may have hoped to shield certain New York
organizations, like newspapers and publishing companies, from
having to defend themselves in defamation suits in other states if
9r Id. (citing O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 528-29, 523
N.E.2d 277, 280-81, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1998)).
9 Id.
97 Id.
9 See Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, at
C302:10 (McKinney 2008) ("The exclusion is based on a policy decision that
recognizes the ease with which a written or oral utterance may occur in New York,
thereby subjecting numerous individuals and media organizations to suit in New
York despite their potentially remote connection to the state.").
9 Id.
100 See SACK, supra note 16, at 15-9.
[Vol. 88:175
2014] DEFAMATION IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY 187
other states were to follow in New York's footsteps. Since the
middle of the twentieth century has been coined "the golden age
of publishing,"10 ' this very well may have been a factor.
A. Other States' Long-Arm Statutes
In fact, some other states did copy New York's long-arm
statute, or had already enacted a long-arm statute similar to that
of New York, by highlighting a specific exclusion for defamation
actions within their respective statutes.12  For example,
Georgia's long-arm statute, enacted in 1966, allows for
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who "[ciommits a tortious act
or omission within th[e] state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation. " 103 However, the statute differs from New York's
long-arm statute in that the defamation exception does not
extend to the provision concerning jurisdiction over an individual
who commits a tortious act outside of the state, causing injury to
an individual within the state.104 Connecticut's long-arm statute,
enacted in 1969, also has a defamation exclusion.0 5 Under
Connecticut's long-arm statute, the defamation exclusion applies
to both tortious acts committed within the state, as well as
tortious acts committed outside of the state, causing injury to an
individual within the state. 0 6 Connecticut courts have strictly
applied this rule, and have refused to "favor subjecting an
1 Books: Publishing, or Publishing and Printing, HIGHBEAM BUSINESS (2014),
http://business.highbeam.conindustry-reports/wood/books-publishing-publishing
printing.
102 See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(2) (West 2011) ("A court of this state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident.. . if he or she ... [c] ommits a
tortious act or omission within this state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act."); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
59b(a)(2)-(3) (West 2004) ("[A] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
nonresident individual ... who ... commits a tortious act within the state, except as
to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; [or] commits a
tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the state,
except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act.").
103 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(2).
104 Id. § 9-10-91(3) (noting that a Georgia court may exercise jurisdiction over a
non-domiciliary who "[c]ommits a tortious injury in th[e] state caused by an act or
omission outside th[e] state if the tort-feasor regularly does or solicits business, or
engages in any other persistent course of conduct").
105 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b(a)(2)-(3).
106 Id.
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individual nonresident utterer of defamation [to jurisdiction],
however hurtful or unfair" the defamatory statements may have
been. 107
Conversely, there are other states that have declined to
make such exceptions for defamation actions within their long-
arm statutes. 08 For example, Illinois, which in 1957 became the
first state to enact a comprehensive long-arm jurisdiction
statute,19 allows for jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries to the full
extent permitted by Due Process. 10 According to the statute, "[a]
court may ... exercise jurisdiction on any ... basis now or
hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the
Constitution of the United States."' Similarly, California's
long-arm statute, enacted in 1969, allows for jurisdiction over a
non-domiciliary "on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of th[e] state or of the United States."112 Finally,
other states, like Florida, allow for jurisdiction over non-
domiciliaries under certain enumerated situations, but fail to
make any exceptions for defamation actions."a
Many states have therefore permitted jurisdiction over out-
of-state defendants who have allegedly defamed in-state
plaintiffs. Doing so has not only been held to be in line with First
Amendment protections, but has also been held not to offend this
country's Constitution. 1 4 Such was the case in Obsidian Finance
107 Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 65, 76 (D. Conn.
2012).
10s See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-209(a)(2) (West 2008) (noting that an
Illinois court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits any
"tortious act within th[e] State"); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(b) (West 2013)
(noting that a Florida court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who
commits any "tortious act within th[e] state").
109 Kristopher B. Knox, Note, Davis v. St. John's Health System, Inc.: General
Jurisdiction, The Door Is Ajar, but How Far Will It Open?, 56 ARK. L. REV. 647, 661
(2003) ("Illinois was the first state to adopt a wide-ranging long-arm statute.").
110 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-209(c).
111 Id.
112 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1970).
113 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(b) (noting that a Florida court may exercise
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits any "tortious act within th[e]
state").
114 See Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 470, 522 N.E.2d 40, 46,
527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 201 (1988) ("The equitable concerns which motivated development
of the doctrine [of long-arm jurisdiction] are amply protected by constitutional due
process."). See generally Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D.
Or. 2011) (exercising jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary in a defamation action,
pursuant to Oregon's long-arm jurisdiction statute).
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Group LLC v. Cox,"' where an Oregon District Court exercised
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who defamed an in-
state plaintiff, pursuant to its own long-arm jurisdiction
statute.116 The plaintiff, an attorney named Kevin Padrick, filed
suit against Crystal Cox, who posted on her online blog that
Padrick was "a THUG and a Thief hiding behind the Skirt tails of
a corrupt un-monitored bankruptcy court system and protected
by Corrupt Bend DA and Corrupt Bend Oregon Judges."'17 Cox
also wrote that Padrick "stole money from the United States
government"' 18 and made other remarks about him hiring a
hitman."9 Not only did the District Court hold that jurisdiction
was proper over Cox, who had to travel from Montana to defend
herself in Oregon, but a jury found the defendant liable in the
sum of $2.5 million. 2 °
III. WHY NEW YORK'S LONG-ARM STATUTE NEEDS To CHANGE
New York's long-arm statute needs to change for the same
reasons that gave rise to Obsidian Finance'2 ' and other
defamation cases-the seriousness of defamation as a tort, and
the extent to which defamatory statements can crush an
individual's reputation and have negative effects in many aspects
of an individual's life. While defamation has often been cast
aside as not being able to induce the same type of damaging
effects as other torts, it is important to realize the priority with
which most people value their reputations and the harm that
defamatory statements can cause. Reputation is "'essential' and
intrinsic in 'every human being,' "122 and for some, it may be the
most important aspect of daily life. Reputation can affect an
individual's career, the way in which others choose to interact
with the individual, and ultimately, an individual's overall self-
"' Obsidian, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220.
116 OR. R. CIV. P. 4(D) (allowing an Oregon court to exercise jurisdiction over a
non-domiciliary who injures a person or property within the state by an act or
omission outside of the state). See generally Obsidian, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220.
"1 Obsidian, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
118 Id. at 1228, 1233; Complaint at 3, Obsidian, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (CV11-
0057 HA).
119 See generally Complaint, supra note 118.
120 DMLP Staff, Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT
(Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/obsidian-finance-group-v-cox.
121 Obsidian, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220.
122 See Post, supra note 1 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
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esteem. Therefore, New York's long-arm statute,123 which is
meant to protect New Yorkers from harm, or at least provide
New Yorkers with a means of redress for harm caused to them,
actually has a gaping hole through which New Yorkers have and
will continue to experience detrimental consequences.
A. Policy Reasons
Given the technological age that we currently live in, New
York's long-arm statute as written presents an immense conflict.
With growing access to the Internet and cell phones, and the
immense popularity of social media, it is becoming much easier
for a non-domiciliary to defame a New York citizen from
anywhere outside of the state's borders.'24  Additionally,
defamation is that much more detrimental to any given
individual, given the vast technology that is so easily at our
fingertips. 25  Currently, the Internet connects hundreds of
millions of individuals who can essentially "access it from their
offices, classrooms, homes and from the road."26 With online
social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, "it is
getting easier and easier to ruin a regular person's reputation
with just a few keystrokes."127
The true damaging effects of defamation combined with
today's technologies are exemplified by cyberbullying-"instances
of individuals willfully and repeatedly inflicting harm [unto
others] through the use of technology," often taking place on the
Internet and often involving defamatory statements.1 28
Cyberbullying has become an effective way for individuals to
harass and defame others, often through online social networking
websites such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. 129  While
some may view cyberbullying as harmless, it is becoming "a
1- N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 2008).
124 See Bosky, supra note 19 ("[Wlith the expansion of the Internet, worldwide
communication is available to anyone with a computer and an Internet connection.").
125 Id.
126 Sam Puathasnanon, Note, Cyberspace and Personal Jurisdiction: The
Problem of Using Internet Contacts To Establish Minimum Contacts, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 691, 694 (1998).
127 Minara El-Rahman, Digital Defamation: The Hot New Tort?, FINDLAW (Oct.
29, 2009, 5:50 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/injured/2009/10/digital-defamation-the-
new-hot-tort.html.
128 Hon. Brian P. Stern & Thomas Evans, Cyberbullying-An Age Old Problem, A
New Generation, R.I. B. J., Mar.-Apr. 2011, at 21.
129 Id.
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serious legal problem. 130  One example of this concerns a
fourteen-year-old girl named Alex Boston.13 ' Alex decided to file
a libel lawsuit against two of her classmates in response to a fake
Facebook page that they created about her, which made it appear
as if she smoked marijuana.132 The Facebook page was also "set
up to appear that Alex had left obscene comments on other
friends' pages, made frequent sexual references and posted a
racist video." 33 This caused Alex a great deal of emotional
distress and made it difficult for her to go to school.3 3 Another
example of cyberbullying involving allegedly defamatory remarks
concerned a group of teenagers' private Facebook group that
accused the plaintiff of contracting AIDS.'35 According to Stacey
Abrams, a Democratic House Representative from Georgia,
"[clyberbullying really goes beyond the four walls of the school or
the four corners of the campus, because if you use a cellphone,
PDA or social media site, then those activities follow the child
both into the school and out of the school."'36 This only goes to
show the drastic effects that cyberbullying, and in essence
defamation, can have not only on a young adolescent's psyche,
but on anyone's psyche. 37 Hence, it is imperative that the New
York legislature revise CPLR section 302 so that victims such as
Alex Boston can receive justice in a New York court of law if their
defamer happens to be from outside of the state.
Another example that highlights the need to change the
language of New York's long-arm statute is the tragic story of
Tyler Clementi. 138  Tyler was an eighteen-year-old Rutgers
University freshman who decided to take his own life after
discovering that his roommate had secretly posted a video on the
Internet, which featured him romantically involved with another
130 E1-Rahman, supra note 127.
131 Greg Bluestein & Dorie Turner, School Cyberbullying Victims Fight Back in





1 Julie Hilden, Defamation on Facebook: Why a New York Court Dismissed a
Recent Suit, Part One in a Two-Part Series of Columns, FINDLAW (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20100817.html.
136 Bluestein & Turner, supra note 131.
137 Id.
138 Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html.
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man.'39 While the criminal case that ensued against Tyler's
roommate dealt with an invasion of privacy and not
defamation, 140 the story surrounding Tyler's death is one that
shows just how powerful and widespread the effects of Internet
postings can be when it comes to meddling with a person's
reputation.' 4 ' Therefore, since the effects of such online activity
can essentially be felt from anywhere around the world, it is vital
that individuals who have suffered from actionable harm, like
defamatory remarks, not be further inconvenienced by not being
able to seek redress in a state court where the harm actually took
place.
One aspect that may be a contributing factor to the
phenomenon of increased online defamation is the fact that the
Internet is not regulated or monitored by a single person or
entity. 4 1 While the National Science Foundation funds a
substantial portion of the Internet,1 there is an immense lack of
monitoring that makes it even easier for defamatory remarks to
appear online because of the inexistence of an official authority to
enforce the law in cyberspace. However, this is understandable
given the vast amount of information that is constantly being
generated online, and the monitoring of such would take up an
immeasurable amount of resources. Therefore, while individuals
are understandably allowed to roam free on the Internet, they
should nonetheless be subject to liability for their own unlawful
actions. However, this is currently not the case for non-
domiciliaries who have defamed New York citizens, and who are
therefore able to get away with such unscrupulous conduct.
Additionally, New York's long-arm statute does not seem to
be fair given the damaging effects of defamatory statements and
the state's ability to exercise jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries
who commit any other tort. Why should jurisdiction be proper in
New York when a non-domiciliary tortuously injures a New
Yorker in any way except as to defamation-a tort that can be
just as damaging as, if not worse than, others? Proponents for
the exclusion have argued how easy it is to defame someone,
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See Bosky, supra note 19 (noting how individuals who post things on the
Internet often fail to realize the consequences of their actions--"[w]hat you type
today can haunt you tomorrow").
142 Puathasnanon, supra note 126, at 695.
143 Id.
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stating that an individual who merely defames a New York
citizen should not be forced to travel long distances to defend
themselves in a New York court of law. 44 However, the same can
be said about any other tort. Take battery for example-the
intentional touching of another that results in harmful or
offensive contact. 145 It would be just as easy for someone who has
traveled into the state to batter a New York citizen, as it would
be for that same individual to defame somebody in the state.
While it may be argued that individuals are more deterred from
committing battery as opposed to defamation-given the social
norms of society and the potential for criminal sanctions-there
are similar deterrents that exist for not defaming others. It is no
secret that individuals can be subject to monetary damages for
defaming people. Defamation suits have been around for a long
time and have constantly been brought to the public's attention,
particularly when famous celebrities have been involved. Such
was the case when Jerry Seinfeld was sued by Missy Chase
Lapine after calling the woman a "nut job," "a wacko," and
"hysterical" on David Letterman's "The Late Show." 4
6
Additionally, in order for one to be found liable in a defamation
action, it must be established that the victim's reputation was
damaged.'47 In this way, being able to satisfy the very elements
of the tort provides for a high enough burden that, if met,
justifies haling non-domiciliaries into a New York court of law in
order to defend themselves.
B. Changing the Statute Would Not Offend Due Process or the
First Amendment
In addition to being supported by numerous policy reasons,
amending New York's long-arm statute would not offend Due
Process or any other provision of the United States Constitution.
In International Shoe Company v. Washington, the Supreme
Court held that in order for a state to be able to exercise
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary, that non-domiciliary must
144 Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, at C302:8
(McKinney 2008).
145 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 173 (9th ed. 2009).
146 Jonathan Turley, Latest Celebrity Defamation Lawsuit: Jerry Seinfeld and
Wife Sued for Defamation, RES IPSA LOCQUITOR ("THE THING ITSELF SPEAKS") (Jan.
8, 2008), http://jonathanturley.org/2008/01/08/latest-celebrity-defamation-lawsuit-
jerry-seinfeld-and-wife-sued-for-defamation.
147 See supra note 62.
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have certain minimum contacts with the forum state, so as to
"not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "14 Additionally, by directing certain activities towards
the forum state, a non-domiciliary should expect to be haled into
court there. 49  Therefore, when one commits a tortious act
against a New Yorker, that individual has directed tortious
activity towards the forum state. In doing so, it should be
reasonably foreseeable that the individual may be haled into
court there. Hence, the commission of a tort, including
defamation, is enough to fulfill the minimum contacts standard
of International Shoe, and the exercise of jurisdiction in such a
matter would not offend Due Process. This principle is further
evidenced by other states' long-arm statutes, which allow for the
exercise of jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who commit any
tort causing injury to in-state plaintiffs. 5 ° Under such statutes,
individuals have been forced to travel to other states to defend
themselves in defamation suits, and that practice has not been
held to offend the Constitution.15 '
Amending the statute would also not infringe upon the
constitutional protections of free speech. The First Amendment
states that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press."'52 Similarly, the New York
State Constitution guarantees that "no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."5 3
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that not all
speech is to be protected.'" The Court has recognized that
speech that elicits illegal activity or imminent violence is outside
'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
149 Id. at 316-17.
150 See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-209(a)(2) (West 2008) (noting that an
Illinois court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits any
"tortious act within th[e] State"); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(b) (West 2013)
(noting that a Florida court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who
commits any "tortious act within th[e] state").
151 See cases cited supra note 114.
152 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
153 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
15 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) ("[T]he First... Amendment[]
ha[s] never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak
whenever or wherever he pleases or to use any form of address in any circumstances
that he chooses."); see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (noting
how the history of First Amendment jurisprudence has permitted that certain
"categories of speech ... be exempted from the First Amendment's protection").
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the boundaries of protection. 15   The same limitation has also
been applied to obscenity and defamation.'56 The rationale for
these exclusions is to protect individuals from actual harm. 157
Plaintiffs who can show that such speech caused them injury do
not face a "constitutional hurdle" as the Court has recognized the
"essential dignity and worth of every human being."158 The New
York State Constitution also recognizes an individual's right to
bring a libel action, providing that those who engage in such
activity will be "responsible for the abuse of that right [of free
speech] ."159
In Rosenblatt v. Baer,160 Justice Stewart stated in his
concurring opinion that "[t]he right of a man to the protection of
his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity
and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any
decent system of ordered liberty."6 ' Therefore, plaintiffs who are
defamed should be compensated for "impairment of reputation
and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering. 1 62 In that sense, amending New
York's long-arm statute would not only comport with the First
Amendment, but would also reaffirm its very purpose-to
155 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem... [including] the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.").
156 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468.
"' See Nat Stern, Implications of Libel Doctrine for Nondefamatory Falsehoods
Under the First Amendment, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 465, 477 (2012) (quoting
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42 (1974)) ("As Gertz observed, libel
laws seek 'the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by
defamatory falsehood.' These laws therefore find their justification in the state's
'legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury.' ").
15' Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
' See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
160 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. 75.
161 Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
162 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
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promote free expression while still protecting individuals from
the actual harm that may be caused by the very freedom the
amendment is meant to protect. 163
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, when a person commits a tortious act, the
tortfeasor causes injury to another who should be able to seek
redress in a court of law where the injury took place. Such only
seems fair and in accordance with our system of justice.
Therefore, it is unfair for a New York court to be unable to
exercise jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who defame New
Yorkers, while simultaneously being able to exercise jurisdiction
over non-domiciliaries who commit any other tort in New York.
Defamatory statements have the potential to tarnish an
individual's reputation and to cause that individual great harm.
Additionally, defamatory statements are becoming more
prevalent given the technology that surrounds us. Since the
advent of the Internet, e-mail, Facebook, Twitter, and smart
phones, individuals have had the ability to use such far-reaching
technologies with malicious intent. The New York legislature
and the New York courts need to recognize "these changing
circumstances [and] must adapt and contemporize their former
analytic approaches to accommodate modern society, much in the
same way the International Shoe [C]ourt confronted the evolving
commercial realities of postwar America."164 This can easily be
accomplished by removing the language that excludes acts of
defamation from New York's long-arm statute in CPLR sections
302(a)(2) and 302(a)(3), thereby granting New York courts the
right to exercise jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who defame
people in New York, and subjecting such tortfeasors to liability
for their actions which cause harm within the state.
163 See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 93 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The First and
Fourteenth Amendments have not stripped private citizens of all means of redress
for injuries inflicted upon them by careless liars.").
1'4 Puathasnanon, supra note 126, at 716-17.
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